How far away is hydrogen? Its role in the medium and long-term decarbonisation of the European energy system  by Sgobbi, Alessandra et al.
ww.sciencedirect.com
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u rn a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 9e3 5Available online at wScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/heHow far away is hydrogen? Its role in the medium
and long-term decarbonisation of the European
energy system*Alessandra Sgobbi a,*, Wouter Nijs a,1, Rocco De Miglio b,2,
Alessandro Chiodi b,2, Maurizio Gargiulo b,2, Christian Thiel a,3
a European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy and Transport, Westerduinweg 3, NL-1755LE
Petten, The Netherlands
b E4SMA S.r.l., Via Livorno 60, I-10144 Torino, Italya r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 7 July 2015
Received in revised form
1 September 2015
Accepted 1 September 2015







EU28* The views expressed are purely those of
the European Commission.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ31 224 565171
E-mail addresses: alessandra.sgobbi@ec.e
Miglio), alessandro.chiodi@e4sma.com (A. C
1 Tel.: þ31 224 565481.
2 Tel.: þ39 011 2257351.
3 Tel.: þ39 0332 789207.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2015.09.004
0360-3199/Copyright © 2015, The Authors. Publishe
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.orga b s t r a c t
Hydrogen is a promising avenue for decarbonising energy systems and providing flexibility.
In this paper, the JRC-EU-TIMES model e a bottom-up, technology-rich model of the EU28
energy systeme is used to assess the role of hydrogen in a future decarbonised Europe under
two climate scenarios, current policy initiative (CPI) and long-term decarbonisation (CAP).
Our results indicate that hydrogen could becomea viable option already in 2030ehowever, a
long-term CO2 cap is needed to sustain the transition. In the CAP scenario, the share of
hydrogen in the final energy consumption of the transport and industry sectors reaches 5%
and 6% by 2050. Low-carbon hydrogen production technologies dominate, and electrolysers
provide flexibility by absorbing electricity at times of high availability of intermittent sour-
ces. Hydrogen could also play a significant role in the industrial and transport sectors, while
the emergence of stationary hydrogen fuel cells for hydrogen-to-power would require sig-
nificant cost improvements, over and above those projected by the experts.
Copyright © 2015, The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Hydrogen Energy
Publications, LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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Energy security, competitiveness and climate change are key
policy drivers for the European Union. The conclusions on the
2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework of the European
Council [1] endorse a binding target for the EU of at least 40%
domestic reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by
2030 compared to 1990 levels, coupledwith aminimumof 27%
renewable energy and energy efficiency improvements. The
challenge remains on identifying the best way to reduce GHG
emissions, while at the same time improving competitive-
ness, growth, and security of supply.
This has rekindled interest in the “hydrogen economy”,
based on hydrogen as a promising clean energy carrier for
decarbonised energy systems, if produced from renewable
energy sources, or coupled with carbon capture and storage
(CCS) or nuclear energy. Its penetration in the energy system
could help to reduce GHG emissions, in particular in sectors
where decarbonisation is the hardest [2]. Moreover, flexible
hydrogen production technologies, coupled with hydrogen
storage options, could provide added flexibility in the face of
fluctuating energy demand.
The European Union (EU) has been actively pursuing ad-
vancements in hydrogen and fuel cells since the late 80s,
supporting with over EUR 500M more than 200 research
projects on hydrogen production, distribution, storage, end-
use technologies, and best practices to promote the update
of clean hydrogen technologies.4 In 2002, the then-
Commissioners for Energy and Transport and for Research
established the High Level Group for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells
Technologies, tasked with developing a vision on the po-
tential contribution of hydrogen to sustainable energy [3]. In
2008, the European Council adopted Council Regulation 521/
2008 [4], establishing the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint
Technology Initiative, which was renewed and strengthened
in 2014 [5]. This represents an important publiceprivate
partnership, aimed at accelerating the development and
deployment of hydrogen and fuel cells.5 For transport, the
new EU Directive on the “deployment of alternative fuels
recharging and refuelling infrastructure” [6] aims amongst
others “at ensuring a sufficient number of publicly accessible
hydrogen refuelling points, with common standards, in the
Member States who opt for hydrogen infrastructure, to be
built by end-2025”.6
Several European countries have developed national stra-
tegies to support the penetration of hydrogen and fuel cells in
their energy systems. The German National Innovation Pro-
gramme for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology makes 1.4
billion V available over 10 years (2007e2016), with funding
from public and private sources. It aims at advancing the
deployment of hydrogen based technologies in all energy/
transport sectors [7]. In France, various aspects of hydrogen
energy pathways are covered within the 34 roadmaps of the4 http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/eu/index_en.cfm?
pg¼research-fch-support [last accessed on 21.05.15].
5 http://www.fch-ju.eu/ [last accessed on 21.05.15].
6 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1053_en.htm [last
accessed on 21.05.15].“New Industrial France” [8]. Despite the renewed efforts in
technological research and development for hydrogen and
fuel cells, the hydrogen economy is not yet developed, and
several technological and non-technical barriers persist.
France Strategie [9], for example, questions the role that
hydrogen can play in the energy transition and argues that it is
a too costly alternative.
Improving our understanding of the role that hydrogen
could play in decarbonising the energy system in Europe is
critical in informing better targeted policies in support of the
sector. In doing so, it is important to realise that assessing the
role of hydrogen in isolation from the rest of the energy sys-
tem may lead to biased inferences, failing to capture in-
teractions with other drivers of the energy system, as well as
competition among sectors for primary energy.
Several authors address the opportunities and challenges
of hydrogen. For an early review, see Ref. [10]. More recently,
Ref. [2] reviews the barriers and opportunities for the
deployment of hydrogen in the transport sector. They
conclude that sustained high fossil fuel costs, large deploy-
ment of renewables and CCS, limited breakthrough in
vehicle batteries, as well as stringent mitigation targets for
the transport sector, are pre-conditions for the transition to a
hydrogen-based mobility. Ref. [11] assesses the economic
attractiveness of hydrogen production technologies, and
concludes that coal and natural gas remain the most
attractive processes from an economic perspective. The
paper, however, focuses on the current situation, without
considering technological improvements, competition with
other sectors for fuels, nor climate change concerns.
Bottom-up energy system models, either in isolation or
coupled with additional tools, have been used to assess the
role of hydrogen in overall decarbonisation, addressing trade-
offs within the wider energy system, at different levels of
governance. For instance, Refs. [12e15] focus on the UK, while
Ref. [16] on Germany, Ref. [17] on theUS, and Ref. [18] on Japan.
Some studies at the sub-national level have also been un-
dertaken (for instance, Ref. [19] looks at hydrogen use in the
transport sector in the region of Madrid). The focus on the
European energy system can be found in Refs. [20] and
[21e23]. Capros and co-authors [21e23] show that hydrogen is
cost-effective in Europe in the long-term as a means to store
excess power. At the global level, Ref. [24] finds that hydrogen
production shifts towards renewable sources over time, in a
carbon-constrained world, while Refs. [25,26] assess the key
factors influencing the deployment of hydrogen fuel cell ve-
hicles at the global scale.
Despite the different approaches and assumptions, these
studies agree in considering investment costs in hydrogen
production and consumption technologies a key obstacle.
Moreover, they tend to identify a critical role of hydrogen for
long-term decarbonisation, with a significant deployment
starting usually around 2040 in a carbon-constrained world.7
And, without a strong carbon price signal, the role of
hydrogen remains limited.7 Ref. [15] shows that, applying dynamic growth constraints to
take into account of the time needed for the diffusion of new
powertrains leads to a smoother transition, starting earlier,
around 2030.
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role of hydrogen in decarbonising the energy system in
Europe. We extend the analysis to the energy system of the
European Union as a whole, with a higher level of techno-
logical detail for hydrogen supply, for which this paper pro-
vides key techno-economic parameters. This paper also
provides an up-to-date assessment of the potential role of
hydrogen given current policies and expected developments
in Europe, by integrating in the analysis the latest climate and
energy policies of the European Commission for 2030 (Refs. [1]
and [27]). Our analysis focuses on the pathways for hydrogen
production and consumption, discussing in detail production
technologies, delivery and storage options, and hydrogen in
the end-use sectors. We explicitly allow for hydrogen elec-
trolysers and storage to provide system flexibility, and assess
the extent to which this is cost-competitive in Europe. To do
so, we use the JRC-EU-TIMES, a linear optimisation, bottom-
up, technology-rich model of the European energy system
[28,29]. The results of such analysis can provide valuable in-
sights and contributions to the current and revived debates on
the hydrogen economy in Europe, and help prioritise research
in this field.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Methodology section describes the JRC-EU-TIMES model,
focussing on: the main assumptions (The JRC-EU-TIMES model
e main assumptions section); the improved hydrogen supply
and demand pathways (The hydrogen energy system in the
JRC-EU-TIMES section); and the modelled scenarios (Modelled
scenarios section). Results and discussion presents and dis-
cusses the main results of this study, starting with Hydrogen
production technologies section, hydrogen delivery and secto-
ral consumption (Hydrogen delivery and consumption section),
and hydrogen storage (Hydrogen storage and system
flexibilitysection). Conclusions section concludes the paper.Methodology
The JRC-EU-TIMES model is a partial equilibrium, linear
optimisation bottom-up technology model generated with
the TIMES model generator from Energy Technology System
Analysis Programme (ETSAP)8 of the International Energy
Agency ([28,29]). It represents the 28 EU member States
(EU28) plus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway from 2005 to
2050, with each country constituting one region of the
model. The JRC-EU-TIMES explicitly considers energy supply
sector and transformation e primary energy supply, elec-
tricity and heat generation e and five energy demand sec-
tors e industry; residential; commercial; agriculture; and
transport. Fig. 1 depicts the structure of the reference energy
system.
The objective of a TIMESmodel is the satisfaction of energy
services demand while minimising (via linear programming)
the discounted net present value (NPV) of energy system
costs, subject to several constraints. Some constraints are
generally applicable, such as: balance constraints for all en-
ergy forms and emissions, relations between allowed energy8 http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/index.asp [last accessed on 17.
08.15].generation and capacities as well as constraints that guar-
antee that variable costs are proportional to a certain energy
generation. All these generalised constraints are explained in
Refs. [28,29]. Other constraints are more specific and depend
on the analysed case, such as: supply limits for primary re-
sources, technical constraints governing the creation, opera-
tion, and abandonment of each technology, and timing of
investment payments and other cash flows. The most
important specific constraints are discussed in Modelled
scenarios section. For this, TIMES simultaneously decides on
equipment investment and operation, primary energy supply
and energy trade. Fig. 2 summarises the key characteristics of
the JRC-EU-TIMES model.
It is important to point out that energy system optimisa-
tion is different from doing NPV calculations for analysing the
business case of a certain technology. The most important
difference is that in an energy system model, prices are not
predefined, so endogenous. For instance the price of electricity
which is an important driver for hydrogen electrolysers, is
endogenous.
An extensive description of the JRC-EU-TIMES can be found
in Ref. [30]. Themain drivers and exogenous inputs are: (1) the
“theoretical” end-use energy services and materials demand;
(2) characteristics of the existing and future energy related
technologies, such as efficiency, stock, availability, invest-
ment costs, operation and maintenance costs, and discount
rate; (3) present and future sources of primary energy supply
and their potentials; and (4) policy constraints and assump-
tions. These have been updated based on more recent data as
well as policy developments.
The JRC-EU-TIMES model e main assumptions
The end-use energy services and materials demand pro-
jections for each country are differentiated by economic
sector and end-use energy service, with 2005 historical data as
the base year. The underlyingmacroeconomic projections and
sector specific assumptions have been updated in line with
Ref. [31]. In the current research framework, emission reduc-
tion can also be achieved by lowering the demand for energy
services, at a cost to the energy system, depending on their
price elasticity.
Country and sector-specific energy balances are derived
from Eurostat data, determining the energy technology pro-
files for supply and demand technologies in the base year. The
techno-economic parameters for technologies beyond the
base year are updated, following Ref. [32]. Compared to Ref.
[30], a higher level of technological detail is implemented for
several renewable electricity generation technologies (photo-
voltaics, concentrated solar power, and ocean energy). On the
demand side, the representation of energy efficiency in
buildings is improved, with the explicit modelling of insu-
lation options in residential and commercial buildings.
Different to Ref. [30], we have disaggregated the car technol-
ogies further for this study, differentiating between 50 car
powertrain variants including several improvement levels for
conventional cars, alternative-fuel cars, battery electric vehi-
cles (BEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), and
hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) cars. The techno-economic assump-
tions for these technologies are based on Ref. [33]. Member
Fig. 1 e Structure of the reference energy system in the JRC-EU-TIMES.
Fig. 2 e Simplified structure of the JRC-EU-TIMES model.
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implicitly considered in themodel through the base year data.
Themodelling of hydrogen is also further refined, as described
in detail in The hydrogen energy system in the JRC-EU-TIMES
section.The assumptions regarding the potential for solar, wind
and marine energy have been updated, based on more recent
data, studies and country-level analysis, as well as modelling
features. The potentials for tidal and wave are derived from
Refs. [34,35], modified based on experts' assumption for the
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better reflect competition for space.
Each year is divided in 12 time-slices that represent an
average of day, night and peak demand for every one of the
four seasons of the year. To address flexibility issues, each
time-slice of the power sector is further split into two sub-
periods. In 12 out of the 24 sub-periods, there is a possible
excess generation of electricity, endogenously calculated for
each country based on the installed power of photovoltaic
panels, wind and wave technologies as well as on demand
profiles. This allows modelling the competition amongst
curtailment and different transformation and storage options
in case of excessive variable renewable electricity production.
The hydrogen energy system in the JRC-EU-TIMES
The hydrogen energy system is modelled in detail, including
centralised and decentralised hydrogen production technol-
ogies with the associated delivery pathways, and blending of
natural gas and hydrogen; and several end-use technologies
for transportation and stationary applications, as well as
hydrogen-to-power stationary fuel cells. The conceptual
model structure of the hydrogen supply chain is presented in
Fig. 3. Bolat and Thiel [36,37] provide an extensive review of
the literature on techno-economic descriptions of each stage
of the chain.
This structure allows gaining insight in the role of
hydrogen consumption in all end-use sectors, the primary
energy vector from which hydrogen is produced, as well as
storage.
Hydrogen production and delivery
Fourmain categories of hydrogen production technologies are
considered: (i) Gasification and pyrolysis (coal or biomass)9; (ii)
Reforming, from natural gas, ethanol, biomass or heavy fuel
oil; (iii) Electrolysis; this category groups alkaline and proton
exchange membrane (PEM) electrolysers, whose cost evolu-
tion is expected to be aligned over time; and (iv) Nuclear very
high temperature reactor. These can be centralised and/or
decentralised and of different sizes. Their techno-economic
parameters are summarised in Table 1.
It is important to highlight that, in our model, biomass
hydrogen production pathways coupled with CCS allows the
net removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.
This is an important driver in the technology uptake, and it
reflects the concept of negative emissions from bioenergy
with CCS (Bio-CCS) which has been gaining increasing
importance in the last decade. The possibility of Bio-CCS was
recognised by the EU already in its Energy Roadmap 2050 [48]
in 2011. According to the IEA Greenhouse Gases Programme,
bio-CCS could remove 800 million tonnes of CO2 annually by9 Supercritical water gasification is considered a promising
technology for the efficient conversion of wet (high moisture
content) biomass into a product gas that after upgrading can be
used as substitute natural gas or hydrogen rich gas [38,39].
However, the paucity of quantitative techno-economic parame-
ters and their evolution over time, as well as the lack of distinc-
tion in biomass moisture content in the current version of the
JRC-EU-TIMES model, does not allow exploring the actual
competition with other hydrogen production options.2050 using available sustainable biomass in Europe alone, over
and above the reduction achieved by replacing fossil fuels [49].
Bio-CCS is already deployed at industrial scale, though not in
Europe [49]. According to guidelines from the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change ([50,51]), negative emissions
from bio-CCS are allowed, coupled with measures to ensure
full accounting in the land use emission inventory, and that
there is no double-counting for imported biomass. While
biomass sustainability issues might be an additional concern
with bio-CCS, in our model, bioenergy sustainability is
ensured exogenously, as the biomass available for energy is
estimated taking into account sustainable harvesting levels.
In addition to dedicated supply technologies, in our model
hydrogen is a by-product of ammonia and chlorine advanced
production processes (advanced membrane and iron-oxide
blast furnace).
Hydrogen can be delivered in liquid or gaseous forms from
centralised production. For decentralised delivery pathways,
shorter distribution chains are assumed. The delivery path-
ways considered include: delivery of hydrogen by road (short/
long) in liquefied/compressed gas form ended with a refuel-
ling process liquid to liquid, liquid to gas and gas to gas in
small/large scales; delivery of hydrogen by ship of liquefied
hydrogen, which can also be delivered to end use with pipe-
lines and road transport; delivery of gaseous hydrogen by
pipeline system; and blending hydrogen with natural gas
within the current natural gas infrastructure, serving all sec-
tors. We consider a maximum concentration of 15% of
hydrogen by volume, as it is assumed that with this relatively
low concentration it is not necessary to invest in extensive
modifications of pipelines and end-use devices, following
existing literature [52]. As hydrogen can be blended in the
natural gas pipelines it can also be traded across regions via
this route.
Table 2 summarises the techno-economic parameters of
delivery processes considered in the model.
Three different storage technologies have been identified
as relevant and explicitly included in the model: two cen-
tralised storage typologies (underground and tank storage)
and decentralised tank storage.
The techno-economic parameters of the storage technol-
ogies and their traceable injection-withdrawals operation
time resolution levels are summarised in Table 3.
End-use technologies
Hydrogen as a transport commodity can be consumed in fuel
cell buses, cars and light and heavy duty trucks. In addition,
hydrogen-to-power is included in the model: 100 kW proton
exchange membrane fuel cell systems running on hydrogen
produce electricity with efficiency at peak electrical load that
increase from 44% in 2015 to 46% in 2050 (Table 4).
In the industrial sector, hydrogen direct reduction is
considered a technically viable option in Europe starting from
2030 onwards. This is considered one of the innovative tech-
nologies with the highest future potential in the iron and steel
sector in the long-term [54], but it is not currently considered
competitive in Europe, even though it is explored in other
countries [55]. In addition to existing hydrogen use technolo-
gies, our model also includes the use of hydrogen for the
production of first generation biofuels, as well as carbon
Fig. 3 e Structure of the hydrogen supply and delivery chain.
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Table 1 e Techno-economic parameters of hydrogen production technologies for the years 2015 and 2030.










MW 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 Years
Coal gasification, large
size, centralised
1667 0.90 462.46 350.94 27.50 22.41 0.16 0.12 0.90 [37,40]
Coal gasification, medium
size, centralised
434 0.80 573.37 573.37 14.33 14.33 0.22 0.00 0.80 [37,41]
Coal gasification þ carbon capture,
large size, centralised
1667 0.90 570.97 363.25 41.00 22.69 0.20 0.13 0.90 [37,40]
Coal gasification þ carbon capture,
medium size, centralised
442 0.80 660.83 660.83 27.45 27.45 0.26 0.00 0.80 [37,41]
Biomass gasification,
small size, decentralised
0.7 0.71 4101.10 3099.11 81.94 81.94 1.83 0.00 0.71 [37,42]
Biomass gasification,
medium size, centralised
33 0.90 2637.55 1290.62 131.74 64.50 0.93 0.00 0.90 [37,40]
Biomass gasification þ carbon capture,
medium size, centralised
33 0.90 2651.22 1309.21 111.52 65.32 0.93 0.00 0.90 [37,40]
Kvaerner process, centralised 19 0.90 1993.33 1993.33 79.81 79.81 0.70 0.70 0.90 [37,43]
Biomass steam reforming, centralised 235 0.90 519.31 519.31 20.77 20.77 0.18 0.00 0.90 [37,44]
Methane steam reforming,
large size, centralised
1530 0.90 201.16 158.25 9.84 7.65 0.08 0.05 0.90 [37,40]
Methane steam reforming,
small size, centralised
33 0.90 431.85 344.39 16.40 12.76 0.14 0.05 0.90 [37,40]
Methane steam reforming þ carbon
capture, large size, centralised
1502 0.90 284.71 191.33 14.21 11.48 0.53 0.07 0.90 [37,40]
Methane steam reforming þ carbon
capture, small size, centralised
33 0.90 590.37 450.75 29.52 23.84 0.20 0.07 0.90 [37,40]
Solar steam reforming of
methane, centralised
150 0.87 309.92 309.92 21.67 21.67 0.11 0.11 0.87 [37,45]
Methane steam reforming,
medium size, decentralised
2 0.86 485.78 376.87 28.21 28.21 0.04 0.04 0.86 [37,45]
Methane steam reforming,
small size, decentralised
0.7 0.90 1847.65 1157.79 44.55 22.96 0.65 0.40 0.90 [37,40]
Ethanol steam reforming, decentralised 0.01 0.90 7379.68 7379.68 19.65 19.65 0.90 [37,46]
Solar steam reforming of methane,
decentralised
0.1 0.33 851.85 851.85 17.14 17.14 0.33 [37,47]
Central PO of heavy oil (CPO3) 300 0.90 431.85 431.85 21.59 21.59 0.14 0.14 0.90 [37,43]
Alkaline/PEM electrolyser, large
size, centralised
72 0.90 625.91 377.20 41.54 26.24 0.15 0.06 0.90 [37,45]
Alkaline/PEM electrolyser, medium
size, centralised
33 0.90 1779.05 444.90 89.92 10.39 0.06 0.06 0.90 [37,40]
Alkaline/PEM electrolyser, small
size, decentralised
0.6 0.90 1940.58 512.48 136.66 25.42 0.96 0.17 0.90 [37,40]
Very high temperature
reactor, centralised
600 0.94 e 4687.31 e 304.67 e 2.60 0.94 JRC own
estimate
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of kerosene and diesel. Such technologies are assumed to
become technically available at the commercial level starting
in 2025. These power-to-liquid technologies use CO2 and
hydrogen and/or electricity that are combined in a reactor to
produce gases, subsequently synthesized into hydrocarbons.
While the electrolysis of hydrogen can be integrated in the
CCU technologies, these can also be designed to use directly
hydrogen. For this analysis, therefore, we assume that the
technology costs could never exceed the cost of amedium size
electrolyser.
It is important to highlight that our model only indirectly
covers the use of hydrogen in refineries and in some industrial
processes, such as in the production of ammonia. According
to Ref. [56], hydrogen consumption in Europe in 2008 wasforecast at 76 billion m3, over 80% of which used by these two
sectors.
Modelled scenarios
For this study we run the model up to 2050 with the following
policy scenarios: (i) a “current policy initiative” scenario (CPI),
which includes the 20-20-20 policy targets of the European
Union (Refs. [57e60]), and is consistent with themedium-term
CO2 emission reduction goals of the European Commission
Communication on A policy framework for climate and energy in
the period from 2020 to 2030 [61]; (ii) a long-term decarbon-
isation scenario (CAP) that, in addition to the assumptions for
2020 and 2030 as in the CPI scenario, includes an overall
emission reduction target of 80% below 1990 levels in 2050. In
Table 2 e Techno-economic parameters of hydrogen delivery technologies for the years 2015 and 2030 (source: Ref. [36],
based on Ref. [43]).









% 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 Years
From centralised production
TRA COMP þ TR þ LIQ þ LSTORB þ RTS þ
REFLL (large, with or without underground storage)
75% 38.71 27.39 2.02 1.43 0.95 0.65 20
TRA COMPþTR þ LIQ þ LSTORB þ RTS þ REFLG
(large, with or without underground storage)
75% 65.69 45.79 2.72 1.90 0.34 0.24 20
RSD and IND COMP þ TR þ DP (with or without
underground storage)
70% 34.04 30.29 1.78 1.57 0.36 0.32 20
TRA COMP þ TR þ DP þ REFGG (large, with or
without underground storage)
70% 80.55 62.02 5.78 4.30 0.55 0.44 20
TRA COMP þ USTOR þ TR þ GSTORB þ
RTS þ REFGG (small)
80% 66.00 47.16 5.02 3.53 0.27 0.19 20
From centralised production for hydrogen blending with gas
All sectors COMP þ USTOR þ TR þ BLENDING 70% 5.87 4.92 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.06 20
From decentralised production
RSD LOCGSTORB þ DP e residential 70% 51.84 43.58 2.50 2.11 0.28 0.25 20
TRA LOCGSTORB þ ONSITELIQ þ REFLL (large) 70% 144.84 98.93 8.99 6.09 1.78 1.20 20
TRA LOCGSTORB þ REFGG (small) 70% 70.18 49.93 5.09 3.57 0.19 0.13 20
Abbreviations: RSD, residential; COM, commercial; TRA, transport; IND, industry; SUP, supply; ELC, electricity; AGR, agriculture; COMP,
compression; TR, transmission pipeline; LIQ, liquefaction; ONSITELIQ, on site liquefaction; LSTORB, liquid storage bulk; LSTORS, liquid storage
small; GSTORB, gas storage bulk; LOCGSTORB, local gas storage bulk; GSTORS, gas storage small (compressed); USTOR, underground storage;
RTS, road transportation short; RTL, road transportation long; DP, distribution pipeline; REFLL(size), refuelling liquid to liquid (size); REFLG(size),
refuelling liquid to gas (size); REFGG(size), refuelling gas to gas (size).
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ergy consumption (excluding non-energy) of 27% in 2030,
aligned with the target adopted by the European Council
([1,27]). We then undertake a comparative analysis of the two
scenarios for the EU28 for 2030 and 2050.
Under both scenarios electrolysers can play a role in
providing flexibility to the energy system, by transforming
(excess) electricity into hydrogen that can be consumed either
with or without storage, as well as stored and transformed
back into electricity.Results and discussion
In our results, and in line with the findings of similar studies,
as shown in Fig. 4, already in the CPI scenario the role of
hydrogen in the EU28 energy system in 2050 is higher than in
2020, with a total production in the EU28 of approximately
250 PJ in 2050. With a long-term CO2 cap, hydrogen deploy-
ment increases rapidly beyond 2030, with total production 6
times higher in 2050 with respect to the CPI scenario (1600 PJ).
With a long-term CO2 cap, the share of hydrogen in final
energy consumption grows from less than 1% in 2030 to 4% in
2050. On the other hand, in the CPI, the share of hydrogen in
final energy consumption is less than 1% (Fig. 5).
While the contribution of hydrogen might still seem
limited, it is important to note that the hydrogen production
chain e in particular biomass þ CCS e plays as critical role in
the decarbonisation of specific sectors, such as industry and
transport. Moreover, hydrogen becomes an important source
of system flexibility. Hydrogen delivery and consumption andHydrogen storage and systemflexibility sections explore these
results in more detail.
Hydrogen production technologies
A higher penetration of hydrogen in the energy system is no
guarantee in itself that its carbon intensity will decrease: the
advantages of using hydrogen as a fuel depend on how
hydrogen is produced in the first place.
According to the literature (e.g. Ref. [2]), natural gas steam
reforming, coal gasification andwater electrolysers are proven
technologies which are already deployed, though with a
limited role. In a carbon-constrained world, it is expected that
new technologies based on renewables will take over, in
particular biomass-based hydrogen production. However, the
extent to which biomass will be used for hydrogen production
also depends on competition with other sectors. Solar steam
reforming ofmethane is also being researched at themoment,
though the technology range is limited to countries with a
high solar radiation, notably Southern Europe and Northern
Africa. It is also expected that coal gasification and gas
reformingwill only be an option in themedium to long-term if
coupled with carbon capture and storage. Finally, the role for
nuclear power plants in hydrogen production remains highly
uncertain, and thought possible only with very high hydrogen
demands.
Our results are in line with the prevailing literature in
showing a marked shift of hydrogen production technologies
towards renewables. As shown in Fig. 6, in both scenarios
production is dominated by a handful of technologies, with
the choice largely driven by a combination of techno-







[%] 2015 2030 2015 2030 Years
Centralised hydrogen
underground storage
DayNight/seasonal 100 3.53 2.71 0.30 0.23 30 [53]
Centralised hydrogen
gas tank storage
DayNight/seasonal 98 13.25 10.19 0.61 0.47 22 [43]
Distributed hydrogen
gas tank storage
DayNight/seasonal 98 23.67 18.21 1.09 0.84 22 [43]
a Costs are linked to the size of the storage.
Table 4 e Techno-economic parameters of PEM hydrogen fuel cells for the years 2015 and 2030.






2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 Years
100 kW PEM fuel cell system DayNight 44 46 3500 2000 118 80 10 JRC
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efficiency targets, and competition for primary energy. In both
cases, decentralised production technologies do not reach
market competitiveness.
Competition with other sectors and a stringent CO2 target,
coupledwith energy efficiency requirements, drive out almost
entirely fossil-fuel based hydrogen production e with the
exception of medium-size, centralised coal gasification with
CCS. With a long-term emission reduction target (CAP sce-
nario), the increasing electrification of the sector is clear: in
2050, the output of centralised electrolysers increases from
130 PJ in the CPI to 480 PJ in the CAP scenario. This points to the
role of the sector in absorbing excess electricity from variable
sources. Electrolysers' activity level peaks during the day (with
over 90% of the production), in particular in summer and
spring.
At the same time, the share of biomass-based hydrogen
production reaches 44% of the total (excluding industrial
hydrogen by-product) in 2050, compared to only 6% in the CPI
(Fig. 7). Similarly, CCS (biomass and coal gasification) is used
for almost 70% of production, compared to 25% in the CPI.
While biomass gasificationwith CCS is not cost-competitive in
the CPI scenario, it becomes the main source of hydrogen inFig. 4 e Total hydrogen production in the EU28 under the
two scenarios.absolute term by 2050 in the CAP (almost 700 PJ). This result is
strongly driven by assumption that biomass use coupled with
CCS allows a net absorption of emissions e under the CAP
scenario, this technology is very attractive as it allows for a
relaxation of the overall CO2 emission constraint. A 30% lower
CO2 capture rate efficiency in Bio-CCS already drives biomass
gasification with CCS out of the technology mix, substituted
by coal gasification and methane steam reforming with CCS,
and electrolysers. Interestingly, the role of hydrogen in the
energy system is strengthened with the reduced options for
CO2 capturing, with total production in 2050 18% higher. A
similar result is found when CCS technologies in general are
assumed not to be available, as discussed later in this section.
In our scenarios, solar steam reforming of methane and
very high temperature nuclear reactors for co-producing
hydrogen and electricity do not become cost-competitive
over the modelled horizon.10 While the latter is driven
mostly by high capital intensity compared to other hydrogen
production technologies, the former is limited in its deploy-
ment by the availability of high direct solar irradiation. The
analysis however does not take into account other, non-cost
related, elements that might influence market deployment
of technologies, such as legislative barriers or public
resistance.
Finally, the production of hydrogen as a by-product of in-
dustrial processes becomes less relevant e declining from
about 28e16% in 2030 to 17e3% in 2050 in the CPI and CAP
respectively.
Our modelling results indicate that hydrogen production, in
particular in the CAP scenario, relies heavily on a few tech-
nologies e and, more importantly, on the use of CCS to decar-
bonise the sector. It is important to understandwhether a delay
in the availability of CCS, or an increase in its cost, could
jeopardise the role of hydrogen. We find that, on the contrary,10 New nuclear capacity e over and above the currently planned
plants e is installed over the time horizon for electricity
production.
Fig. 5 e Final energy consumption by fuel in the two scenarios for 2030 and 2050.
Fig. 6 e Hydrogen production technologies in the EU28 under the two scenarios, including by-product of industrial
processes.
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technologies could only be deployed with a 10 year delay, and
with a 40% higher investment costs, increases the long-term
availability of hydrogen e in the CAP scenario in 2050,
hydrogen production would be 20% higher. This is becausehydrogen is even more needed to help decarbonise the system
in the medium-term, when the use of fossil fuels has to be
further reduced. This result is evenmore striking if CCS is not a
viable option within the modelled time frame e this could be
the result, for instance, of technology failure or social and
Fig. 7 e Share of feedstock and energy carriers in hydrogen production in the EU28 in the two scenarios for 2030 and 2050.
12 It is important to point out that the final demand for transport
(both pkm and tkm) is lower than the theoretical demands,
because of price elasticity of the transport sector. In particular, in
2050: the demand for public transport is 4e6% lower in the CPI
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2050 increases by 80% compared to the CAP. With costly
and delayed CCS the production of hydrogen still relies heavily
on CCS technologies, though only after 2040. Prior to then, it is
electrolysers which fill the gap. With CCS unavailable,
hydrogen production relies almost exclusively on electrolysers.
Hydrogen delivery and consumption
Under both scenarios, hydrogen is used in sectors that have
limited decarbonisation options and increasing energy needs,
transport and industry (Fig. 8). This trend intensifies in the
long-term in the CAP scenario.
In the industrial sector, hydrogen becomes an important
input as reducing agent for the iron and steel industry,
contributing 6% of the total final industrial energy consump-
tion in 2050 under the CAP scenario, as opposed to only 1% in
the CPI. Industrial hydrogen use in the CAP in 2050 constitutes
almost 70% of the total use in the energy system in Europe. In
the CPI, iron and steel production from primary ore relies on a
combination of fossil fuels with a high carbon content, in
particular coke. The introduction of hydrogen as a reducing
agent e in itself produced mostly from low-carbon technolo-
gies e allows halving the use of fossils, thus significantly
reducing the CO2 emissions of the sector. This is in line with
our finding, and aligned with results from similar studies (see,
for instance, Ref. [62]). ULCOS (Ultra-LowCO2 Steelmaking)
11e
an EU programme launched by a consortium of 48 partners
with support from the European Commission e is investi-
gating breakthrough technologies that could help decarbonise
the hydrogen and steel sector, but the consortium does not
expect direct hydrogen reduction to become viable in the
medium-term [63]. Fischedick et al. [54] find direct reduction
more attractive than other low-carbon innovative technolo-
gies in the sector, including iron ore electrolysers, as it enables
harnessing the opportunity of cheap excess renewable energy
through electrolysis and hydrogen storage. This is in line with
our results that see an important role of direct hydrogen
reduction in the iron and steel sector in the long-term (2050).11 See http://www.ulcos.org/en/index.php [last accessed on 21.
05.15].The second largest consumer of hydrogen is the transport
sector. Electrification of transport is the most important
avenue for decarbonising the sector: almost 30% of transport
final energy consumption in 2050 is constituted by electricity,
compared to less than 10% in the CPI. Given the strong
decarbonisation requirements, hydrogen-fuelled vehicles also
start to become competitive in 2050, though their penetration
remains low: according to our result, the share of hydrogen in
transport final energy consumption reaches 5% in the CAP
scenario in 2050, as opposed to less than 1% in the CPI, and
virtually no deployment in 2030 in both scenarios.
Under the CAP scenario, hydrogen-fuelled vehicles become
competitive for passenger and freight transport. Hydrogen
fuel cells cars are deployed under the CAP scenario in 2050,
covering more than 6% of the total passenger per kilometre
(pkm) demand, while there is no deployment in the CPI in our
model. This is mostly based on carbon intensity of trans-
portation and fuel-efficiency compared to other technologies
e while EV are the main type of transport for passengers in
both scenarios in 2050, in the CAP advanced gasoline cars are
less attractive compared to the CPI because of the more
stringent cap. The deployment in the public transport sector is
even more striking: both for intercity and urban trans-
portation, hydrogen-fuelled buses are deployed in 2050,
covering 3% of passengers' demand in the CPI scenario e and
nearly 40% in the CAP scenario. In the latter case, an earlier
deployment (2040) is also observed compared to the CPI. It is
mostly diesel-powered buses that are driven out in the longer-
term, and substituted by hydrogen-fuel cells powered vehi-
cles. Finally, in the freight transport sector, hydrogen fuel-cell
heavy-duty vehicles and, to a lesser extent, light-duty vehicles
satisfy more than 10% of demand in 2050 in the CAP scenario,
compared to 1.6% in the CPI.12 In conclusion, based on cost-
competitiveness alone (i.e. disregarding issues such as non-and CAP respectively; the demand for car transport is 2% lower in
the CAP; and the demand for freight transport, the most elastic, is
4e8% lower in the CPI and CAP respectively.
Fig. 8 e Sectoral hydrogen consumption as share of total hydrogen consumed (figure) and PJ (legend) in the two scenarios e
2030 (top) and 2050 (bottom).
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results, there is a role to play for hydrogen vehicles by 2050
alongside other low carbon vehicles.
In addition to these two large sectoral uses of hydrogen,
other uses are also emerging in the model, grouped under the
“other sector” categories in Fig. 8. These include agriculture,
biofuels production, and supply sectors. In 2030 and 2050, only
the supply sector makes use of hydrogen in the two scenarios.
This includes the production of electricity from stationary
hydrogen fuel-cells, and the production of synthetic fuels via
CCU technologies.
Under the CPI scenario, a large share of hydrogen (just over
30% in 2050) is used for the production of kerosene. However,
with a long-term cap on emission, this technology is driven
out of the energy system. While this result may seem coun-
terintuitive, it can be understood by considering that the use
of kerosene has a high cost in terms of CO2 emissions: with a
stringent GHG emission reduction target, the use of all carbon-intensive fuels has to be reduced and there is, therefore, no
scope for additional production. Indeed, the consumption of
kerosene in the CAP scenario is 16% lower than in the CPI by
2050.
On the other hand, hydrogen-to-power becomes cost-
effective only in the CAP scenario, and only from 2040. The
absorption of cheap excess electricity produced by renew-
ables, and the low cost of hydrogen, make it cost-competitive
even if the round-trip efficiency of stationary fuel-cells is low
(around 44e46%, see Table 4). This technology remains how-
ever marginal e less than 1% of the total electricity produced.
Significant cost reductions in hydrogen PEM fuel cells are still
needed for this technology to be largely deployed. Even with a
25% reduction in investment costs compared to the input in
Table 4 would lead to only marginal increases in its
deployment.
Finally, with our modelling assumptions, hydrogen and
natural gas blending has only a minor role to play in
Fig. 9 e Annualised investment in hydrogen production
and delivery for both scenarios in 2030 and 2050.
13 It is important to point out that, while the share of intermit-
tent electricity in total electricity produced is the same in the two
scenarios, in absolute terms, by 2050, intermittent electricity is
20% higher in the CAP than in the CPI.
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current thinking of the gas industry, though it is again a
result of the stringency of the CO2 emission target: hydrogen
and natural gas blending brings about relatively small sav-
ings in emissions. In an energy system perspective, hydrogen
is allocated to uses where it can substitute more carbon-
intensive fuels, thus generating higher emission savings.
Reducing the cost of cost of hydrogen and gas blending (such
as compression, transportation, adjustment to end-use
technologies, …) could marginally improve the prospects: a
25% reduction would only lead to a 5% increase in the
hydrogen blended with natural gas in the residential sector
in the CAP scenario.
The penetration of hydrogen in the energy system requires
a significant increase in investment for the associated
hydrogen delivery infrastructure (Fig. 9). The total annual in-
vestment for delivery by 2050 increases from 0.6bnV2015 in the
CPI to just over 7bn V2015 in the CAP scenario. This represents
over 50% of the total investment costs in the hydrogen econ-
omy. As expected, the bulk of investment is in the transport
and industrial sectors. Despite this remarkable increase, the
cost of hydrogen compared to the total investment needs of
the energy system (supply and demand sides) remains smalle
less than 1% of the total e as hydrogen's share in final energy
consumption remains low.
Hydrogen storage and system flexibility
Finally, with a long-term emission reduction target hydrogen
becomes relevant in complementing electricity storage op-
tions, able to provide additional flexibility to the energy sys-
tem. Fig. 10 shows the total annual electricity stored, aswell as
the total electricity used for electrolysers and being curtailed.
The increasingly important role of electrolysers in using
excess electricity is evident: electricity for electrolysers con-
stitutes, in 2050, 23% and 42% of the electricity stored in the
CPI and CAP scenarios e under the CAP, this is equivalent to
about 4% of the total electricity produced in the EU28. Elec-
trolysers become the most important form of absorbing
excess electricity in 2050 in the CAP scenario, and the increase
between 2030 and 2050 is significantly more than what is
observed for storagemedia, in the face of a 15% increase in thetotal generated electricity, and a stable share of intermittent
electricity.13 These results support the value of hydrogen in
providing system flexibility under a stringent climate mitiga-
tion target.
Coupled with the use of electricity to produce hydrogen
with high availability of renewable sources, hydrogen is also
stored, both underground and above ground. Hydrogen
stored increases significantly and, in the CAP scenario in
2050, it is four times higher than in the CPI. Consequently,
the capacity for hydrogen storage increases: in the CPI, ca-
pacity reaches 26 PJ and 50 PJ in 2030 and 2050, while in the
CAP it increases from about 37 PJ to 150 PJ (Fig. 11, red bars). In
both scenarios, centralised tanks constitute the bulk of
storage capacity in 2050, coupled with centralised electro-
lysers (about 36e38% of the hydrogen stored in tanks comes
from electrolysers). It is indeed important to point out that,
as shown in Fig. 3, underground storage can only be associ-
ated with large scale coal gasification and methane steam
reforming e technologies which play a minor role in the
long-term under both the CPI and the CAP scenario. This
partly drives the type of hydrogen storage that is chosen in
ourmodel (For interpretation of the references to color in this
paragraph, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.).
Our results confirm the important role that hydrogen
could play in dampening day/night (and, to a lesser extent,
seasonal) variations in electricity demand by providing sys-
tem flexibility via storage. It is also interesting to look at the
pattern of storage (red bars)/discharge (blue bars) at the
night/day level, shown in Fig. 11 for 2050. First of all, cen-
tralised tanks represent the main hydrogen storage option
under both scenarios, with underground storage represent-
ing in 2050 less than 1% of the total activity level in the CAP
scenario. Secondly, centralised storage of hydrogen is
preferred for short-term variability, as shown by the charge
and discharge pattern. And thirdly, hydrogen is stored
exclusively during the day, and primarily during periods with
a high level of intermittent electricity production (notably
solar): this result supports the intuition that hydrogen stor-
age, in particular electrolysers, can play a role in absorbing
cheap excess electricity for release in periods with lower
intermittent electricity production (For interpretation of the
references to color in this paragraph, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.).Conclusions
The JRC-EU-TIMES model e a bottom-up technology-rich
model of the EU28 energy system plus Switzerland, Iceland,
and Norway e is used to assess the role of hydrogen in a
future decarbonised energy system in Europe. The detailed
representation of the hydrogen system, including produc-
tion, delivery, storage and end-use technologies make it
suitable tool to address in-depth questions related to the role
Fig. 10 e Electricity inflow into storage and electrolysers, and curtailment.
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decarbonising energy systems, both in the current policy
initiative scenario, as well as under a long-term decarbon-
isation path.
While care is needed in interpreting the results of
modelling exercises such as this one, as they can be sensitive
to the input data and other assumptions, transparency in theFig. 11 e Day/night hydrogen storage in the EU in the two scena
(bottom) and capacity levels (red bar) (For interpretation of the re
to the web version of this article.).input data, as well as the key drivers and exogenous as-
sumptions, facilitate interpreting the results reported in
this paper. Further improvement in the modelling frame-
work, such as the inclusion of non-cost related technological
barriers and non-rational aspects that condition investment
in new and more efficient technologies, could help deepen
the understanding of technological choices. With respect torios in 2050 for tank storage (top) and underground storage
ferences to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred
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specification in particular on the hydrogen consumption
side would allow a more in-depth assessment of hydrogen
pathways. In this context, areas for further work include:
further options for blending; the specification of storage
technologies and their potential, both underground and
above ground; Bio-CCS; a more detailed specification of the
industrial-sector; the inclusion of additional frontier tech-
nologies on the supply side (such has supercritical water
gasification of biomass, coal and organic waste for hydrogen
production), and on the consumption side (such as
hydrogen-fuelled planes). Coupling the JRC-EU-TIMES with
geographically referenced information to better understand
hydrogen storage would also bring enhanced realism to
these results. Despite the uncertainty associated with the
analysis of futures in a long-term horizon, energy system
models such as the JRC-EU-TIMES can provide interesting
insights on the potential role of hydrogen in Europe and
beyond, as well as areas where policies could focus to further
enhance it.
The results of our analysis indicate that the deployment of
hydrogen in an energy system perspective is strongly
and positively influenced by the presence of a stringent
overall CO2 emission reduction target. Our results depart from
existing literature in indicating an earlier and faster start of
hydrogen penetration in the energy system before 2040, even
under the CPI scenario. This might be partly due to the “per-
fect foresight” nature of models such as the JRC-EU-TIMES,
and by the role that hydrogen production plays in coping
with variable electricity on the one hand, and with emission
reduction on the other, in particular through centralised
electrolysers and Bio-CCS. Moreover, our results highlight the
important role that hydrogen can play in the medium- and
long-term decarbonisation of the European energy system, in
particular by: providing alternative energy sources in those
sectors with limited low-carbon energy technology options,
notably transport and industry; and providing additional
flexibility, enabling the energy system to better cope with
fluctuations in energy demands.
While in the long term even under the CPI scenario low-
carbon production technologies are important (notably
methane steam reformingwith CCS), under the CAP this trend
is even more accentuated, with coal and biomass gasification
coupled with CCS playing an important role, followed by
electrolysers. The technology portfolio is partly driven by as-
sumptions on Bio-CCS. However, it is important to point out
that the delay or absence of CCS optionswould not decrease or
slow down the penetration of hydrogen, on the contrary:
while the technology mix would be markedly different (with
an even stronger role for electrolysers), hydrogen would play
an even more decisive role in decarbonisation. On the other
hand, and perhaps in contrast to the expectations of the gas
sector, with our modelling assumptions, hydrogen has a
limited role in lowering the emissions of gas use, in particular
in the long-term. This is driven by the relatively small savings
in emissions.
In our model, the iron and steel sector is the main con-
sumer of hydrogen both in the medium and long-term: pri-
mary iron production processes rely for 18e50% on hydrogen
in 2050 under the CPI and CAP scenario respectively. Thisresult is contingent upon the technological specification of
the iron and steel sector: the introduction of more technol-
ogies would allow a more detailed exploration of the poten-
tials for hydrogen in the sector. The penetration of hydrogen
in the transport sector is also significant. Under the CAP
scenario, in our modelling results hydrogen contributes
about 5% of the sector's final energy consumption (compared
to virtually no deployment in the CPI). Hydrogen production
and storage also have a role to play in increasing system
flexibility: storage supports flexibility in consumption sec-
tors, enabling to store hydrogen during periods of high var-
iable electricity production, when electrolysers can benefit
from cheap electricity for production. Stationary fuel cells,
on the other hand, remain marginal: significant cost re-
ductions are still needed to ensure the cost-competitiveness
of this technology and its penetration in the energy system in
Europe. Finally, the penetration of hydrogen in the energy
system requires a significant increase in investment for the
associated hydrogen production and delivery infrastructure.
However, the cost of the hydrogen infrastructure compared
to the total investment needs of the energy system (supply
and demand sides) remains small e less than 1% of the total.
This is a reflection of the relative importance of hydrogen as
energy carrier in the system: despite the very high growth
rates between 2030 and 2050, its share contribution remains
low.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments
and suggestions of several colleagues of the European Com-
mission's Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy and
Transport. The comments and suggestions of two anonymous
referees are also gratefully acknowledged.
Glossary of terms and acronyms
AGR agriculture
ANNCOST annual energy system costs
BEV battery electric vehicle
CAP long-term CO2 cap scenario
CCS carbon capture and storage. Set of technologies that
allow the capturing of CO2, its transportation and









ETRI energy technology reference indicators
EU European Union
EU28 All European Union countries (including Croatia)
GHG greenhouse gases
GJ gigajoule, or 1 J  109 (see joule)
GSTORB gas storage bulk
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GW unit of electric power equal to one billion watts, one
thousand megawatts, or 1.34 million horsepower
enough to supply a medium size city.
H2 hydrogen
HFC hydrogen fuel cell
IND industry
JRC European Commission's Joint Research Centre
kW unit of power, equal to one thousand watts
kW h kilowatt/hour, or 1 W  1 h  103
LIQ liquefaction
LOCGSTORB local gas storage bulk
LSTORB liquid storage bulk
LSTORS liquid storage small
MW megawatt is a unit derived from energy, used for
measuring energy capacity. It is equal to 1 million
watts
NPV net present value
O&M operation and maintenance
ONSITELIQ on site liquefaction
PEM proton exchange membrane
PHEV plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PHS pumped hydro storage
PJ petajoule. Standard unit of energy. For electricity:
1 PJ equals 277.78 million kW h
pkm passenger per kilometre
R region
REFGG refuelling gas to gas
REFLG refuelling liquid to gas




RTL road transportation long
RTS road transportation short
SUP supply
TIMES The integrated MARKAL-EFOM system
tkm tonnes per kilometre
TR transmission pipeline
TRA transport
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